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Family Law
DANiL E. MURRAY*
The author surveys recent Florida cases and legislation per-
taining to marriage, dissolution of marriage, alimony, property
rights, child support, adoption, illegitimacy and miscellaneous
related areas.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The production of new statutes by the Florida Legislature has
continued to increase in 1977, but the quality of the output seems
to be inversely proportional to the quantity. Too frequently the
creation, amendment and repeal of statutes covering the same area
of law is accomplished by separate legislative enactments, resulting
in uncertainty and confusion. A prime example of this problem
arose in the family law area this year. The legislature repealed'
section 741.06 of the Florida Statutes (1975), which prohibited the
issuance of a marriage license to males under the age of eighteen
years or females under the age of sixteen years, regardless of paren-
tal consent, unless the minor was a parent or expectant parent of a
child. The same statute was also amended in a separate act' to
1. 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-19, § 2 (repealing FLA. STAT. § 741.06 (1975)).
2. Id. ch. 77-121, § 65 (amending FLA. STAT. § 741.06 (1975).
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indicate the change in the age of majority from twenty-one to eight-
een. Another statute relating to the issuance of marriage licenses,
section 741.04 of the Florida Statutes (1975), was amended in three
separate legislative enactments3 to prohibit the issuance of a mar-
riage license to a party under the age of eighteen unless written
parental consent has been presented and filed. The result of all
these changes, according to the Attorney General of Florida, has
been the removal of any statutorily imposed age requirement for
receiving a marriage license when the license applicant, although a
minor, has obtained the written consent of his parents or guardians.
In the absence of a controlling statute to the contrary, the common
law rules regarding the age at which a person is deemed competent
to contract a valid marriage, i.e. fourteen years of age for a male and
twelve years of age for a female, should be applied in issuing mar-
riage licenses to minors who have obtained the required parental
consent.' It is doubtful that the Florida Legislature intended to
create this atavistic result, but when three uncoordinated enact-
ments become law, one cannot expect much more.
11. MARRIAGE
In Duey v. Duey,5 the District Court of Appeal, Third District,
held that there was no common law marriage when a husband and
wife separated one day before the dissolution of their marriage and
then resumed cohabitating, holding themselves out as husband and
wife three weeks later. The court found that the evidence of general
repute, cohabitation, capacity and present intent to become man
and wife was insufficient to establish the existence of a common law
marriage in this case.
A. Legislation
The Florida Legislature amended the marriage license statute
to reduce the age of consent for marriage licenses from twenty-one
to eighteen.7 At the same time the legislature eliminated, to a large
extent, the requirement of posting a notice of the application for a
marriage license at the front door of the courthouse for three days.
The posting requirement has been maintained only for counties
having a population of less than 75,000 residents.8 The marriage
3. Id. ch. 77-19, § 1; ch. 77-121, § 64; ch. 77-139, § 1.
4. Fla. Att'y Gen. Op. 078-5 to -6 (Jan. 10, 1978).
5. 343 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
6. Id. at 897.
7. 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-19, § 1 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 741.04(1) (1977)).
8. F A. STAT. § 741.04(3) (1977).
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license statute was further amended to provide that marriage licen-
ses may not be issued to two individuals of the same sex?
III. DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE
A. Jurisdiction
In Simpson v. Simpson,"0 a district court held that the legal
residence of the wife does not necessarily follow that of her husband
insofar as jurisdiction for dissolution is concerned; the wife's legal
residence is a question of fact.
B. Venue
Section 47.163 of the Florida Statutes (1975), which provided
that no change of venue could be made to any county in which either
of the parties resided except by their consent, has been repealed."
In Guth v. Guth," a divorced wife sought modification of the
divorce decree. The husband's petition for change of venue was
granted by the circuit court and an interlocutory appeal was taken.
The district court reversed, denying the change of venue on the basis
of section 47.163 of the Florida Statutes (1975). While the appeal
was pending, however, section 47.163 was repealed, and the district
court subsequently vacated its prior opinion and granted the change
of venue in accordance with section 47.122 of the Florida Statutes
(1975), the forum non conveniens statute. The district court noted
that an appellate court, in reviewing a judgment on direct appeal,
should dispose of the case according to the law prevailing at the time
of the appeal and not the law in effect at the time of the judgment
appealed. 3
Under section 47.011 of the Florida Statutes (1977), the proper
venue in a dissolution proceeding is the county "in which the parties
were last present with a common intent to remain married."'"
9. 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-139, § 1 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 741.04(1) (1977)).
10. 339 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976) (per curiam).
11. 1976 Fla. Laws, ch. 76-22, § 1 (repealing FLA. STAT. § 47.163 (1975)).
12. 346 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977) (per curiam), vacating 340 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. 4th
Dist. 1976) (opinion withdrawn from reporter).
13. Florida E. Coast Ry. v. Rouse, 194 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1966).
14. Barr v. Barr, 343 So. 2d 1326, 1327 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977) (per curiam). FLA. STAT. §
47.011 (1977) provides: "Actions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant
resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located. This
section shall not apply to actions against nonresidents."
1072 [Vol. 32:1069
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C. Amendments of Final Judgments
In Nahoom v. Nahoom,15 the trial court was not permitted to
amend a final judgment of dissolution after it had lost jurisdiction
of the case as a result of the expiration of the time for filing a motion
for rehearing. The amendment was not allowed even though the
judge was of the view that an amended judgment would more fully
express his intentions than did the final judgment. On the other
hand, in Adkins v. Adkins, 6 the district court affirmed per curiam
the actions of a trial court judge who, two months after entering a
final judgment of dissolution, modified it substantially. The trial
court judge issued the amended judgment without granting a new
trial or rehearing, apparently on the basis that the court had been
too generous toward the wife in its alimony and property awards in
the original judgment. The district court upheld the amended judg-
ment despite the contention that the trial judge was not authorized
to reweigh evidence and materially alter the original judgment more
than two months after its issuance.
In Buckley v. Buckley, 7 the trial court declined to consider a
husband's motion to amend final judgment because the final judg-
ment had been appealed. The Florida District Court of Appeal,
Fourth District, upheld the trial court's refusal to modify the initial
order because the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the mat-
ter while the case was being considered by the appellate court.
D. Appeals
In an attempt to reconcile conflicting case law, the Supreme
Court of Florida in Gazil v. Gazil18 held that an appellate court may,
within its discretion, either entertain or dismiss an appeal when the
appellant has disobeyed a trial court's order; but he must be given
a period of grace within which to comply with the order before the
appeal is dismissed. If the appellant has left the state in order to
escape the power of the trial court, his appeal may be dismissed
without the granting of any grace period. Justice Boyd dissented on
the ground that although a contemnor ought to be punished for his
contempt, his right to appeal should not be taken from him."9
The District Court of Appeal, First District, held in McLean v.
McLean, 0 that when a party takes an interlocutory appeal (without
15. 341 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977) (per curiamn).
16. 339 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976) (per curiam).
17. 343 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977).
18. 343 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 1977), rev'g 313 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
19. Id. at 598 (Boyd, J., dissenting).
20. 340 So. 2d 493 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
1978]
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supersedeas) from a refusal of the trial court to grant a continuance
because of the alleged unavailability of a witness, the trial court
may continue proceedings by ordering the party to submit his proof
and then dismissing his case when he fails to do so while the case is
on appeal. Chief Judge Boyer, dissenting, was of the view that the
trial court does not have the power to make a final disposition of
the case while it is being appealed.'
When neither an order granting a supersedeas bond for an ap-
peal nor the bond itself provides that the bond is to pay monetary
awards of a dissolution judgment if the appeal is unsuccessful, but
rather uses language covering the wife's damages and expenses oc-
casioned by the delay of the appeal, the bonding company is not
liable to the wife when the husband fails to pay lump-sum alimony
and attorney's fees. 22
The court in Claughton v. Claughton23 held that an award of
temporary alimony and child support recommended by a special
master should not be disturbed unless it appears that the finding is
clearly erroneous or that the master has misconceived the legal ef-
fect of the evidence. Since in the instant case no record of the pro-
ceedings accompanied the master's report or the filed exceptions to
it, the court held that the master's recommendations should have
been affirmed by the court below.2' In a somewhat similar vein, if
an appellant fails on appeal to produce a full record of the testimony
before the trial court and the portion which is produced supports the
trial court's findings, then the appellate court must simply affirm
the trial court's order.25
Florida Appellate Rule 3.16(a), which provides that
"reasonable costs for preparing the record-on-appeal by the clerk of
the lower court may be taxed in the lower court after the filing of
the mandate,""5 was construed in Mullins v. Mullins27 to prevent a
trial court from ordering the husband in a dissolution action to pay
the costs of preparing a transcript needed for the wife's appeal.
E. Collateral Attack
Rule 1.540(b) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that a motion based on the fraud of the other party must be filed
21. Id. at 497 (Boyer, C.J., dissenting).
22. Pro v. American Druggists' Ins, Co., 345 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977).
23. 347 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977) (per curiam).
24. Id. at 438.
25. O'Connor v. O'Connor, 347 So. 2d 438 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977) (per curiam).
26. FLA. App. R. 3.16 (a) (emphasis added).
27. 342 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
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within one year of the judgment; however, if the judgment is void
the motion must be made within a reasonable time. If the fraud
consists of a perjured affidavit for constructive service of process,
then the court never had jurisdiction over the defendant, and its
judgment is void with the result that the motion may be made
within a reasonable time.28
After the death of her spouse, a wife may bring a suit to set
aside a dissolution obtained by him on constructive service if she is
able to show that he made no efforts to determine her residence
when he signed an affidavit stating that he had made a diligent
search and inquiry to ascertain it."
IV. ALIMONY
A. Jurisdiction
In Lefkovitz v. Lefkovitz, 30 a wife sought to enforce in Florida
a judgment from an Illinois divorce proceeding. At the time the
decree was entered the Illinois long-arm statute provided for juris-
diction in divorce and maintenance actions over any person whether
or not a resident of the state who maintained in the state "a matri-
monial domicile at the time the cause of action arose" or who com-
mitted in the state "any act giving rise to the cause of action."' 3' The
husband and wife in Lefkovitz had been domiciled in Illinois until
1971, when the husband left for Florida. The husband made visits
to his family, provided support and made mortgage payments on his
home in Illinois. In 1973, the wife flew to Florida and discovered that
her husband was living in adultery. The wife then instituted suit for
divorce, alimony, child support and attorney's fees in Illinois on the
ground of extreme cruelty, not adultery. The wife secured a judg-
ment and brought suit in Florida on the judgment. The trial court
and a majority of the appellate court agreed that Illinois did not
have in personam jurisdiction over the husband because the act
28. Saharuni v. Saharuni, 343 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977) (per curiam).
29. Mayo v. Mayo, 344 So. 2d 933 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977).
30. 341 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
31. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 17(1)(e) (Smith-Hurd 1968) (amended 1977) provided:
(1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this State, who in
person or through an agent does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated, thereby
submits such person, and, if an individual, his personal representative, to the
jurisdiction of the courts of this State as to any cause of action arising from the
doing of any such acts:
(e) With respect to actions of divorce and separate maintenance, the mainte-
nance in this State of a matrimonial domicile at the time the cause of action arose
or the commission in this State of any act giving rise to the cause of action.
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giving rise to the divorce action was the adultery in Florida. Judge
Smith, dissenting, was of the opinion that because acts of cruelty
rather than adultery were alleged and proved in Illinois, the divorce
court had jurisdiction to award an in personam judgment againt the
husband which should be accorded full faith and credit in Florida.3
B. Discovery
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, attempting to
clarify its decision in Escobar v. Escobar,3 held in Claughton v.
Claughton" that the alleged adulterous conduct of a wife may be
investigated by taking her deposition for purposes of determining
questions of alimony and child custody. The same method may be
employed to inquire about the husband's adulterous conduct in
order to mitigate the wife's conduct bearing on alimony and child
custody determinations. The court cautioned that the inquiry
should be conducted with discretion in order to avoid harm to the
parties, their children and any other parties involved. 5 Despite this
cautionary note, it is submitted that we are gradually coming back
to the idea of fault which no-fault divorce was supposed to elimi-
nate.
In Schneider v. Schneider,6 it was held that a first wife has no
right to discovery proceedings as to the second wife's real property
holdings and commercial accounts in the absence of a showing that
the husband has quit his employment in order to avoid paying ali-
mony to his first wife and is being supported by his second wife.
C. Duration of an Award
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, is of the view that
alimony can be awarded to continue after the death of the husband
as a charge against his estate," but such an award will only be
approved by the courts when special circumstances justify it."
A husband's duty to continue to pay alimony to his former wife
will normally terminate upon her marriage to another; however, if
the wife's new marriage is annulled in a foreign state and the mar-
riage is held void ab initio under the law of that state (even though
32. 341 So. 2d at 257 (Smith, J., dissenting).
33. 300 So. 2d 702 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
34. 344 So. 2d 944 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977) (per curiam).
35. Id. at 947.
36. 348 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977).
37. Krasner v. Krasner, 339 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976) (per curiam).
38. Ros v. Ross, 341 So. 2d 833, 837 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
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the same ground in Florida would render the marriage voidable and
not void), then the duty of support is not terminated."
D. Lump-Sum Alimony
In Maissen v. Maissen,0 the court found that even though the
wife's assets exceeded those of her husband, it was proper to award
her lump-sum alimony (consisting of real property conveyed to the
husband and wife by the wife's father) since she did not possess any
skills and was thus unemployable. The decision seems logical in
view of the fact that the husband had most of his assets in foreign
countries, and the award of the property was the only effective way
of enforcing any award against him.
The trial court's grant of a dissolution of marriage in Seale v.
Seale4 allowed it to retain jurisdiction to award alimony and child
support at a later time, pending further investigation. The District
Court of Appeal, First District, upheld the trial court's reservation
of jurisdiction and further held that it was not an abuse of discretion
for the court to award lump-sum alimony to the wife (in the form
of a one-half undivided interest in all the real property in the name
of the husband) even though the wife had married another before
the award was made. The appellate court justified the award on the
basis that the husband was totally disabled with only disability
income from social security, the wife needed money for child sup-
port even though she was remarried, and the lump-sum award from
the husband's property was the only way to effectuate this duty of
support.42 If the award had been labeled as child support, the deci-
sion would be correct, but justifying an award of alimony on the
grounds of child support seems questionable and an encouragement
to sloppy practice by judges and lawyers.
E. Rehabilitative Alimony
Recent decisions reflect the public policy that if a wife is able
to provide for herself, the courts cannot require her former husband
to pay alimony other than for rehabilitation. In Crees v. Crees,"3 it
was held to be reversible error to award permanent alimony to a
thirty-three year old wife with a four year old child, when the wife
had been employed prior to her five year marriage and was still able
39. Kelley v. Kelley, 350 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977).
40. 347 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977).
41. 350 So. 2d 96 (Fla. lst Dist. 1977).
42. Id. at 98.
43. 342 So. 2d 1014 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977).
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to work. The court was of the view that these facts precluded an
award of rehabilitative alimony for a period of longer than five
years. The court, however, was careful to note that it was not estab-
lishing a five year yardstick for all rehabilitative alimony cases." On
the other hand, in Messer v. Messer 5 it was held to be reversible
error to award rehabilitative alimony for a period of only three years
where the wife was fifty-eight years old with physical and emotional
problems and had little real chance of becoming self-supporting
after being married to a very successful doctor for thirty-one years.
The courts have generally adopted a flexible approach when
awarding rehabitative alimony. In Richter v. Richter," it was held
to be reversible error to award a wife rehabilitative alimony to con-
tinue regardless of her remarriage in the future. The appellate court
in Hawkesworth v. Hawkeworth"7 found that the trial court had
abused its discretion in awarding only rehabilitative alimony where:
(1) the wife had given up her career to marry and raise children; (2)
was in poor health; (3) the husband had a large income; (4) the
marriage was of long duration; and (5) there appeared to be little
opportunity for the wife to redevelop her abilities to become self-
supporting. Similarly, it was reversible error to award rehabilita-
tive, rather than permanent alimony, to a wife where the record
showed no evidence that after a thirty-five year marriage she had
the potential or actual ability to support herself.48
Awards of permanent alimony may be converted to rehabilita-
tive alimony on appeal. In Davies v. Davies" the court found a
permanent alimony award of fifty dollars per week for a wife with
custody of five minor children to be excessive. The award was not
reduced; instead, it was converted to rehabilitative alimony for a
period of three and one-half years. The court was apparently influ-
enced by the fact that the wife had worked before the birth of her
fifth child as well as during the infancy of the other children; it
appeared to disregard the mother's desire to stay at home to care
for the fifth child, who was two and a half years old at the time of
the proceedings.
A trial court, in awarding rehabilitative alimony, may reserve
jurisdiction to reduce, increase, or extend the rehabilitative alimony
or at the expiration of the period to award permanent alimony upon
44. Id. at 1016.
45. 342 So. 2d 1076 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977).
46. 344 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977) (per curiam).
47. 345 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977) (per curiam).
48. West v. West, 345 So. 2d 756 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977) (per curiam).
49. 345 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977).
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a proper showing. 0 In making an award of lump-sum alimony, the
trial court should specify whether the award is permanent or reha-
bilitative. The trial court in Keller v. Keller5 awarded lump-sum
alimony of $121,000 to a relatively young wife, $25,000 to be paid
immediately and $1,600 per month to be paid for sixty months. The
trial court failed to specify whether the award was rehabilitative or
permanent, and the appellate court under the circumstances of the
case construed the award to-be rehabilitative in nature. Conse-,
quently, if the wife were to remarry-or if either spouse
died-during the sixty month period, the court could prevent the
entire $121,000 award from being treated as vested in the wife or her
estate. As a result the husband or his estate would not be obligated
to pay it.
F. Criteria for an Award
In the process of awarding permanent, periodic alimony rather
than the rehabilitative alimony awarded by the trial court, a district
court has articulated nine standards for the awarding of alimony:
(1) the financial ability of the husband; (2) the needs of the wife;
(3) the marital standard of living; (4) the duration of the marriage;
(5) the number of children and housekeeping activities of the wife;
(6) the health of the parties; (7) the wife's contribution to the hus-
band's career; (8) any gross misconduct by either spouse; and (9) a
catchall factor which is that a spouse should not pass from poverty
to prosperity or vice versa as a result of the award.5" There is a
beguiling simplicity in this articulation of criteria which seems to
assure predictability and certainty. In fact, the opposite is true; the
increased number of variables, in conjunction with the possible
weights to be given to each variable by the court, result in unpre-
dictable awards. The trial court becomes a mere way-station to the
appellate court which does as it pleases.
The factors listed above apply whether it is the husband or the
wife who has been awarded alimony. In an unusual case the District
Court of Appeal, Third District, affirmed an award of $30,000 lump-
sum alimony and rehabilitative alimony of $5,000 per month for
eighteen months to a husband whose wife had a net worth of
$4,250,000. 51 The parties, married for nine years, had a high stan-
dard of living furnished primarily by the wife. The husband, age
50. Greene v. Greene, 347 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977).
51. 348 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
52. McAllister v. McAllister, 345 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977).
53. Pfohl v. Pfohl, 345 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
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thirty-seven, was in good physical but impaired mental health. He
was unemployed, with limited employment skills, and he had assets
worth approximately $200,000, most of which were furnished by the
wife.
In Wolfman v. Wolfman," it was held to be reversible error for
a trial court to order more alimony and child support than the
husband could afford to pay in the absence of any proof that the
jiusband was fraudulently earning less than he was capable of earn-
ing. Similarly, it was error for a trial court to award alimony and
support for one child totalling sixty-five percent of the husband's
earning capacity when the wife received from her own earnings and
alimony $165.00 per week, and the husband was left with $44.00 per
week.5"
G. Modification of Alimony
The touchstone for modification of alimony is whether there has
been a substantial change of circumstances since the prior decree.
An award of alimony cannot be modified in the absence of a request
for modification. 6 It is reversible error for a trial court to dismiss
and deny petitions for modification of alimony by both the husband
and wife when neither party has completed its case presentation. 7
Although a court has discretion to modify an alimony award
and to make such modification retroactive to the time when the
husband filed his counterclaim, a trial court should not terminate
any award unless there has been a substantial change of circum-
stances since the entry of the previous award."
H. Termination of Alimony
A wife's subsequent marriage does not automatically terminate
alimony; the husband must apply to the court for termination. In
Simmons v, Simmons,"9 a woman had received alimony from her
former husband for several years but failed to disclose to him that
she was, allegedly, the common law wife of another. The former
husband learned of the fact when the wife instituted proceedings in
54. 344 So. 2d 893 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977).
55. Santacroce v. Santacroce, 347 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977). But cf. Bradley v.
Bradley, 347 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977) (per curiam) (although husband's monthly
income was almost exhausted by alimony and support payments the appellate court would
not reevaluate the trial court's award).
56. Schwebke v. Schwebke, 347 So. 2d 645 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977) (per curiam).
57. Fleet v. Fleet, 345 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977).
58. Steinau v. Steinau, 343 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977).
59. 346 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
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a probate court, claiming to be the common law widow. Under these
circumstances, the court found that it was inequitable for the wife
to receive alimony payments subsequent to her remarriage and or-
dered her to make restitution for all payments made after that date.
I. Enforcement
A final judgment of dissolution which orders a husband to pay
a third party for a debt incurred by the husband and wife may not
be enforced by contempt proceedings 0 because this would consti-
tute an imprisonment for debt which is forbidden by the Florida
Constitution."6
V. PROPERTY RIGHTS
A. Jurisdiction and Res Judicata
In Amend v. Amend, 2 a wife obtained a divorce from her hus-
band in a New York court which had jurisdiction to decide questions
of financial relief for her and her minor children but which failed to
pass on such issues. The wife subsequently filed a petition for sup-
port for herself and her children in Florida. The District Court of
Appeal, Fourth District, held that Florida law does not allow a
divorced wife to seek personal financial relief based solely upon the
marriage relationship unless she has had no previous legal oppor-
tunity to litigate the issue. 3 As a result, the Florida court did not
have the power to award the wife attorney's fees, alimony or an
interest in the former husband's property; it did have juruisdiction
to award child support.
In a post-judgment order, a trial court does not have jurisdic-
tion to impose new obligations not contained in the final judgment.
Consequently, a court cannot order a husband to pay tax liens
against the marital home, even though the liens existed when the
court entered its original order to the husband to make all of the
mortgage payments, if the original order made no mention of the tax
liens."
Unless a trial court specifically reserves jurisdiction over prop-
erty disputes arising out of supplementary agreements between the
spouses, it does not have the power after the entry of final judgment
in a dissolution action to order the disposition of a family business.
60. State ex rel. Reno v. Richardson, 348 So. 2d 62 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977).
61. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 11.
62. 341 So. 2d 1038 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977).
63. Id. at 1039.
64. Altieri v. Altieri, 341 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977) (per curiam).
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Instead, the parties may resort to a separate suit for breach of con-
tract."
In response to a certified question from a district court, the
Supreme Court of Florida has held that a trial court judge may at
any time during the pendency of dissolution proceedings enter a
judgment of dissolution of the marriage and then reserve jurisdic-
tion for the purpose of settling property rights. The judgment of
dissolution is a final judgment with respect to the marital status of
the parties."
A foreign divorce decree which specifically states that no deter-
mination of title to real estate has been made does not make a
subsequent suit in Florida involving real estate issues res judicata17
B. Homestead
In Tullis v. Tullis," a marriage was dissolved by a court order
which made no disposition of the spouses' interest in the former
marital home, held as an estate by the entirety. The husband con-
tinued to reside on the property with his daughter by a prior mar-
riage. The court held that the fact that the property was homestead
property did not prevent the former wife, who was now'a tenant in
common, from bringing partition proceedings. It was stated that the
Florida homestead exemption provision of the Florida Constitu-
tion," which prevents the forced sale of the homestead, was not
designed to prevent a tenant in common from seeking partition for
her interest in the property. The homestead exemption was thus
applied only to the husband's beneficial interest of fifty percent. 0
When a marriage is dissolved, the former spouses become ten-
ants in common of the marital home formerly held by them as
tenants by the entirety. When the wife is granted the right to live
on the property with the children, the property then becomes the
homestead of the wife and children. If the former spouses should sell
this property subsequent to a judgment lien being entered against
the husband, the property loses its homestead status, and the lien
attaches to the home and is subject to enforcement against the
buyers."
65. Jennings v. Jennings, 341 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977).
66. Galbut v. Garfinkl, 340 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 1976).
67. Strickland v. Strickland, 344 So. 2d 931 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977).
68. 342 So. 2d 88 (Fla. 1st Dist, 1977); cf. Hoemke v. Hoemke, 342 So. 2d 127 (Fla. 2d
Dist. 1977); Hoskin v. Hoskin, 329 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
69. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a).
70. 342 So. 2d 88, 89 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977).
71. Sackheim v. Marine Bank & Trust Co., 341 So. 2d 247 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977).
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The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, faced a situation
of this nature in Barnett Bank of Cocoa, N.A. v. Osborne.72 A mar-
riage was dissolved, and the former spouses who had previously
owned their home as tenants by the entirety now held as tenants in
common. The wife was given the right to occupy the property until
the youngest child reached the age of eighteen. A judgment creditor
attempted to levy on the former husband's one-half interest in the
property, and the court held that the levy could be defeated because
the property was subject to the homestead exemption claimed by
the former husband. Judge Anstead, dissenting,73 noted that the
First District had held to the contrary in Tullis v. Tullis,74 with the
result that a lien creditor could levy on the husband's one-half inter-
est. The dissenting judge added that any purchaser at the execution
sale would take subject to the right of possession granted to the
former wife and children under the terms of the judgment."
In a case of first impression, the Supreme Court of Florida held
that a general residuary clause in a will was sufficient to devise the
homestead of a testator to his spouse in the absence of minor chil-
dren.7"
The Supreme Court of Florida has vacated the decision of the
District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, that a grandfather could
not devise his homestead to his widow when he was survived by
grandchildren as well as by his widow.77 The district court had con-
strued the language "the homestead shall not be subject to devise
if the owner is survived by spouse or minor children"78 as dictating
this result7" and had refused to follow a contrary decision" of the
Supreme Court of Florida.
In ITT Rayonier, Inc. v. Wadsworth,8 a widow, who held a life
estate as the widow of a homestead owner, purported to convey the
fee simple title to herself and to another as tenants in common. The
Supreme Court of Florida held that the deed conveying the property
was a "root of title" under the Marketable Title Act,82 and since it
72. 349 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977) (per curiam).
73. Id. at 223-24 (Anstead, J., dissenting).
74. 342 So. 2d 88 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977).
75. 349 So. 2d at 224.
76. Estate of Murphy, 340 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 1976).
77. In re Estate of Endres, 345 So. 2d 793 (Fla. 4th Dist.), vacated sub nom. Endres v.
Matthias, 353 So. 2d 843 (Fla. 1977) (per curiam).
78. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(c).
79. 345 So. 2d 793, 794 (Fla. 4th Dist.), vacated sub non. Endres v. Matthias, 353 So.
2d 843 (Fla. 1977) (per curiam).
80. In re Estate of McCartney, 299 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1974).
81. 346 So. 2d 1004 (Fla. 1977).
82. FA. STAT. §§ 712.01-.10 (1977).
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had been on record for more than thirty years, it was sufficient to
cut off the vested remainder interests of the widow's children in the
property as against the present title holder. 3
C. Partition
It has been held that in the absence of an agreement by the
parties or pleadings asking for partition, a trial court may not parti-
tion property formerly held as an estate by the entirety and now
held as an estate in common by the former husband and wife.84
A final judgment in a dissolution action which orders partition
of the property should, in accordance with section 64.061(4) of the
Florida Statutes (1977), order the sale of nondivisible property and
appoint a special master or clerk to carry out the sale. The final
judgment may provide for a reasonable period within which the
former spouses can arrange for private sale; in the event this is not
accomplished, the judgment should provide for the court-sponsored
sale under section 64.061.11
D. Special Equities Doctrine
A trial court judge must determine the question of a special
equity in property, and it is reversible error for him to appoint
commissioners to recommend a partition of the assets of the par-
ties .
In Scheidl v. Scheidl,87 real property could not have been pur-
chased without the wife's earnings being contributed to the family,
and the husband admitted at trial that the property was supposed
to be placed in joint ownership. Under these facts it was held revers-
ible error for the trial court to deny the wife a special equity in the
property.
In Orr v. John Couture, Inc.,8 a district court had held in a
prior dissolution proceeding that the wife could not obtain any in-
terest in a corporation acquired by herself and her former spouse
based upon the special equity doctrine when the corporation was not
a party to the action, and remanded the case. 9 Using a "Catch-22"
approach, the trial court dismissed the wife's subsequent action
83. 346 So. 2d at 1011-12.
84. Suhor v. Suhor, 341 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977) (per curiam); Harrell v. Harrell,
345 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977).
85. Carlsen v. Carlsen, 346 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977).
86. Margolis v. Margolis, 343 So. 2d 938 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977) (per curiam).
87. 343 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977).
88. 345 So. 2d 394 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
89. Couture v. Couture, 307 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
1084 [Vol. 32:1069
FAMILY LAW
against the corporation on the grounds that she should have pre-
sented this cause of action in her original action. The District Court
of Appeal, Third District, reversed the trial court's order of dis-
missal and held that while a prior dissolution of marriage decree,
like other final decrees in equity, would normally bar any subse-
quent action by either party to determine the question of property
rights, such was not the case when the district court had previously
held that the property rights at issue were not properly before the
trial court in the dissolution action.90
In Jassy v. Jassy,' it was held to be reversible error for a trial
court to order a husband to pay one-half of the mortgage payments
on the marital home when the same order granted the entire title
to the property to the wife on the grounds that she had a special
equity therein.
E. Estates by the Entirety and in Common
Even though title to a home is in the name of the husband
alone, a court in dissolution proceedings may determine that the
parties are tenants in common of the property upon the basis that
it was the intent of the spouses that the home was to be owned
jointly. Furthermore, although it is proper for the court to give the
former wife sole possession of the property until the youngest child
of the parties is eighteen years old, it is reversible error for the court
to enjoin the parties from disposing of or encumbering their respec-
tive interests without the written consent of the other party. Each
party has the right to sell or encumber subject to the wife's right to
possess, which is enforceable against purchasers of the husband's
interest."
It is an abuse of discretion and reversible error for a trial court
to award possession of the family home (held as a tenancy in com-
mon) to the wife and children for a period of only one year when the
children are very young and the husband has the ability to provide
shelter for them without any sacrifice. Possession should be awarded
for so long as the wife remains single and until the youngest child
reaches his majority, or the children die, marry or are no longer
dependent. In addition, the final judgment awarding possession
should specify that each spouse must pay one-half of the mortgage
payments, taxes, insurance, repairs, etc., while the wife and chil-
dren are in possession. 3 It has also been held reversible error to
90. 345 So. 2d at 396.
91. 347 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977).
92. Robinson v. Robinson, 340 So. 2d 935 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
93. Singer v. Singer, 342 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977).
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award exclusive possession of the marital home (an estate by en-
tirety) to the former wife when the youngest child will attain major-
ity very soon after the entry of the judgment and the award has not
been made upon the basis of lump-sum alimony." On the other
hand, another district court has affirmed a trial court's judgment
awarding the wife exclusive use and possession of the marital home
for a period of two years even though there were no minor children
and the award was not based upon a lump-sum alimony concept."
In In re Estate of Nunnelley," a husband pled guilty to the
manslaughter of his wife with whom he owned an estate by the
entirety. The court held that the husband, as the owner of one-half
of the property, became a tenant in common with his deceased
wife's heirs who owned the other one-half interest.
In Rutkin v. Rutkin," a spouse who reduced the balance on a
mortgage encumbering a tenancy in common (formerly held as an
estate by the entirety) was held entitled upon sale of the property
to a credit for the' amount of his payments. The amount paid was
to be deducted from the other spouse's one-half share of the sales
proceeds. In practice, this seems to mean that one-half of the pay-
ments against principal are deducted from one-half of the sales
proceeds and the remainder is then given to the nonpaying spouse."
The district court in Rutkin held as improper the trial court's order
to take almost one-half of the husband's payment and deduct this
sum from the sales proceeds, divide the remainder of the proceeds
equally, and then deduct the remaining credit due to the payor from
the other spouse's share of the proceeds.
When possession of the marital home held as an estate by the
entirety has been awarded to the wife and children with the hus-
band being ordered to pay for the mortgage payments, insurance,
taxes and repairs, the husband will be entitled upon a subsequent
sale of the property to a credit against the wife's proceeds of the sale
in the amount of one-half of such payments. °00
If a wife quitclaims her interest in an estate by the entirety to
her husband in order for him to be able to sell it while she is absent,
the husband is a constructive trustee for the wife's one-half interest
in the event that the marriage is subsequently dissolved. 10'
94. Hazelwood v. Hazelwood, 345 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977).
95. McDonald v. McDonald, 346 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977) (per curiam).
96. 343 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977).
97. 345 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
98. Id. at 401-02.
99. Id. at 401.
100. Waskin v. Waskin, 346 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
101. Johnson v. Johnson, 349 So. 2d 698 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977).
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When two brothers own real property as tenants in common,
each of them may convey to his respective wife and to himself as
tenants by the entirety an undivided one-half interest with the re-
sult that when both brothers die, the surviving wives are tenants in
common of the property. 0
2
In In re Estate of Silvian,°3 a conveyance of land to "Westley
W. Silvian and Frances A. Silvian, husband and wife" was suffi-
cient to create an estate by the entirety in the absence of any con-
trary language in the deed. Furthermore, the purchase of stock is-
sued to the Silvians as joint tenants with right of survivorship was
held to create an estate by the entirety in the stock or at least a joint
tenancy with right of survivorship under section 689.15 of the Flor-
ida Statutes (1977). The same result was held to follow for bank and
savings and loan accounts held in the same manner, even though
the wife had never withdrawn money from the accounts.'
In another transaction at issue in In re Estate of Silvian, the
husband requested his savings and loan association to draw a check,
chargeable to the joint account, to the order of another bank for a
proposed property closing. The closing was never effectuated be-
cause of the death of the husband, and the check was returned to
the savings and loan association. The court held that the check
never lost its character as jointly held funds because: (a) the payee
never received possession of the check and could not be deemed a
holder, and (b) the husband while in possession of the check could
not be deemed a holder because it was not made payable to him,'
and section 1-201(20) of the UCC defines a holder as a "person who
is in possession of . . .an instrument .. .drawn, issued, or en-
dorsed to him or to his order . . . . " It should be noted that all of
the foregoing transactions were based upon the principle that when
a husband supplies funds for the purchase of realty or personalty
and title is taken in his name and the name of his wife, a presump-
tion of a gift arises which can be rebutted only by clear and unequi-
vocal evidence to the contrary. Further discussion in this section
will show that this presumption does not exist in dissolution cases." 7
In In re Estate of Siegal,"°8 a promissory note and mortgage on
land located in New York were given to a husband and wife then
domiciled in New York. The couple later moved to Florida where
102. Baumgardner v. Kennedy, 343 So. 2d 1323 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
103. 347 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977) (per curiam).
104. Id. at 635.
105. Id. at 635-36.
106. FLA. STAT. § 671.201(20) (1977).
107. See text accompanying notes 118-19 infra.
108. 350 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977) (per curiam).
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the husband died. The court deemed the note and mortgage to be
"movable"'0 9 and applied Florida law, with the result that the sur-
viving wife was to be treated as a tenant by the entirety and the note
and mortgage were to be hers. If New York law had been applicable,
the husband and wife would have been viewed as tenants in com-
mon since New York does not recognize estates by the entireties in
personal property.110
F. Fraudulent Conveyances
Green v. Casper"' involved a suit by judgment creditors to set
aside an allegedly fraudulent conveyance. A former husband and
wife, prior to their remarriage, entered into an antenuptial agree-
ment wherein they agreed to create an estate by the entirety of all
real property presently owned by them as tenants in common. The
parties carried out their conveyances after their remarriage but be-
fore a $20,500 judgment in favor of creditors was entered against the
husband. The court refused to set aside the conveyances upon the
mere allegation by the plaintiff creditors that the husband was in-
solvent and in the absence of clear proof that the wife knowingly
participated in the alleged fraud."'
G. Intrafamily Gifts and Conveyances
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, has expressed the
view that a donor need not relinquish exclusive dominion and con-
trol in order to create inter vivos gifts of joint tenancies with rights
of survivorship in a house and a certificate of deposit. In the case of
an inter vivos gift of a joint tenancy in corporate stock, however, a
surrender of some of the donor's dominion and control is necessary
to establish a present irrevocable intent to make such a gift."'
In In re Estate of Brown,"4 it was reversible error to grant sum-
mary judgment in favor of an alleged donee of the corporate stock
of a widow's deceased husband where there was conflicting evidence
concerning the authenticity of the husband's signature on the stock
certificates and where the widow had asserted her nonexpert opinion
that the signatures on the stock certificates were forgeries.
109. Movable property is personal property which follows the owner to and is governed
by the state of his domicile. Id. at 91.
110. Id.
111. 346 So. 2d 1204 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977) (per curiam).
112. Id. at 1205.
113. Freedman v. Freedman, 345 So. 2d 834, 836-37 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
114. 347 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 3d Dist 1977) (per curiam).
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The district court in Supple v. Supple"5 found that a mother
had conveyed realty to her son in consideration for his taking care
of her for her lifetime. The mother sued for rescission on the basis
that the son had failed to render support. On appeal, the district
court held that the trial court could not deny the rescission and
order the son to continue to make payments when neither party had
sought this form of relief.
In Johnson v. Fraccacreta,I's the court held that a general power
of attorney which authorizes the attorney to convey realty does not
authorize the attorney to convey to the grantor of the power and her
husband an estate by the entirety as a gift. The court said that the
general rule that the attorney may not give away the grantor's prop-
erty should be extended to a case where the attorney gives to the
grantor and to her spouse an estate by the entirety."' Similarly, a
general power of attorney which does not plainly and specifically
state that the attorney has the power to convey real estate will not
be construed to confer this power, and any deed executed under this
power of attorney will be deemed void."'
In Ball v. Ball,"' the Supreme Court of Florida abolished the
former rule which created a presumption of a gift when spouses
contributed to property held as an estate by the entirety, but the
decision only had prospective operation as to those suits filed after
the date of the opinion. The District Court of Appeal, Second Dis-
trict, has held that in a suit filed prior to Ball the rule in that district
is that when the wife contributes money to the acquisition and
improvement of property held by the entirety, there is a presump-
tion of a gift, and it requires clear and convincing evidence to rebut
the presumption that she made a gift to her husband of the sums
paid. 2 0
H. Miscellaneous
In Rendel v. Rendel,121 a husband admitted having three ac-
counts in banks in the Cayman Islands but denied that he had any
records of these accounts. The court held that the husband did not
have a right to assert his privilege against self-incrimination when
115. 347 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977); cf. Lauck v. Maissen, 347 So. 2d 795 (Fla. 2d
Dist. 1977) (rescission of deed not allowed where there was no indication of fraud or mistake
or that the grantor had done anything but make a voluntary and unconditional gift).
116. 348 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977).
117. Id. at 572.
118. Bloom v. Weiser, 348 So. 2d 651 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
119. 335 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1976).
120. Powell v. Powell, 349 So. 2d 841 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977).
121. 340 So. 2d 1236 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
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he was ordered by a trial court in dissolution proceedings to author-
ize the banks to provide records of the accounts to his wife. The
court noted that "[tihe privilege against self-incrimination prohib-
its compelling a person to bear witness against himself: it does not
proscribe incriminating evidence elicited from another."' 2
The complaint in Glass v. Long'23 alleged that a wife had exe-
cuted a deed conveying property to her husband, placed it in the
possession of an attorney as escrow agent, and then obtained posses-
sion of the deed from the attorney's secretary and destroyed it. The
wife admitted that she executed the deed and delivered it to the
attorney. The husband was held to have established a prima facie
case for the reestablishment of a lost instrument, and it was error
for the court to dismiss the action.
Where a former husband failed to abide by a court order which
ordered him to vacate the marital home, it was improper for the trial
court to sentence him to a fixed period in jail without complying
with the requirements of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure'12
relating to contempt committed out of the presence of the court. If
the order issued was meant to be for civil contempt, then a sentence
which failed to give the contemnor an opportunity to purge himself
of his contempt was also in error.2 5
Austin v. Austin12 involved a state employee who designated
his first wife and two children as beneficiaries of his state retirement
benefits under the former State Officers and Employees Retirement
System. The employee subsequently divorced his first wife and re-
married. A few years after remarrying, the employee transferred
from the State Officers and Employees Retirement System to the
newly created Florida Retirement System. The District Court of
Appeal, First District, held that the employee's transfer into the
new retirement system did not invalidate his previous designation
of beneficiaries, so that upon the employee's death the former wife
and children designated were entitled to the benefits despite the
employee's divorce and later remarriage. 27 Inasmuch as over
180,000 state employees had transferred into the new retirement
system at the time of the deadline for transferring from the old
system, 28 the Austin decision is of more than academic interest.
122. Id. at 1237.
123. 341 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977).
124. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.840.
125. Pugliese v. Pugliese, 347 So. 2d 422 (Fla. 1977), rev'g 336 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1976).
126. 350 So. 2d 102 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977).
127. Id. at 104-06.
128. Id. at 104.
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I. Legislation
Florida's probate statutes' were amended in 197730 to provide:
(1) that heirs (not just issue) of the decedent conceived before his
death but born thereafter shall inherit intestate property as if they
had been born in the decedent's lifetime; (2) for the purpose of
intestate succession a person born out of wedlock is a lineal descen-
dant of his father if paternity is acknowledged by the father in
writing; and (3) a pretermitted spouse shall receive a spousal share
of the estate as if the deceased spouse had died intestate, unless
"provision has been made for or waived by the spouse by prenuptial
or postnuptial agreement.' '13'
The amended provisions of Florida's homestead statutes3 1 per-
mit the head of a family to claim a homestead exemption from
forced levy and sale for any dwelling house located on land not his
own which he may lawfully possess by lease or otherwise. "Any
dwelling house"'' 3 now includes modular homes and mobile homes
used as residences. 34
VI. ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS
The District Court of Appeal, First District, has rejected the
notion that an attorney's fee in a dissolution action should have
some relationship to the benefits gained by a wife in obtaining prop-
erty from her husband. The court stated in Valparaiso Bank & Trust
Co. v. Sims 35 that the criteria for the fee should include the amount
of time spent by the attorney, the complexity of the issues, the
nature of the responsibility undertaken, the services required and
the degree of skill and diligence necessary. It seems likely, however,
that despite the recitation of these factors, the primary emphasis in
Valparaiso Bank & Trust Co. was on the hours of time spent; the
court reduced the fee from $50,000 to $15,000. The dissenting judge
desired to reduce the fee to $5,150, based upon an hourly rate of
$50.00 per hour. 3 ' It is suggested that judges who are on a fixed
salary with no overhead worries sometimes lose sight of reality.
This relatively "stingy" approach should be compared with
that of the District Court of Appeal, Third District, which upheld
129. FLA. STAT. §§ 732.106, .108 & .301 (1977).
130. 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-87, § 1; ch. 77-174, § 1.
131. FLA. STAT. § 732.301(1) (1977).
132. Id. §§ 222.01-.02, & .05 (1977).
133. Id. § 222.05 (1977).
134. Id.
135. 343 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977).
136. Id. at 972 (Mills, J., dissenting in part).
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an award of attorney's fees in the amount of $30,000 for the husband
when the facts showed that the wife was worth $4,250,000, the hus-
band had a net worth of $200,000 (most of which came from the
wife), the husband's attorneys had secured a $120,000 alimony
award for him, the attorneys were eminent counsel who spent 100
working hours plus twenty hours of associate and law clerk time
preparing for the case, and the expert testimony stated that a rea-
sonable attorney's fee would be $30,000.'1
It has been held reversible error to award attorney's fees based
on two affidavits without a prior notice of hearing or any actual
hearing conducted thereon. '3
Although a wife's petition for dissolution contains no prayer for
attorney's fees, such fees may nevertheless be awarded to her if the
trial court, with the consent of the attorneys for both parties, re-
serves ruling upon attorney's fees for the wife and subsequently
awards them.'35 In a similar vein, it has been held reversible error
for a trial court to award attorney's fees on its own motion without
giving the paying party prior notice of the court's intention to award
such fees.'4"
A trial court may not award attorney's fees to either party when
there is an absence of allegations and proof that the moving party
has a need for any award and that the other party has the ability
to pay.' However, the District Court of Appeal, First District, has
recognized that it is impractical and inappropriate for an appellate
court to determine the financial abilities of the parties at the time
an appellate motion for attorney's fees is filed, without taking testi-
mony or conducting a trial by affidavits.' The court in Dresser v.
Dresser' stated that it would not require factual representations by
the movant concerning circumstances which might justify an appel-
late award of attorney's fees. Rather, the court will deny motions
for attorney's fees when it considers such an award inappropriate
regardless of the parties' financial abilities. When the trial court has
awarded fee money to the moving party and a further award on
account of appellate services appears proper, the court will provi-
sionally grant the motion for allowance of attorney's fees and re-
mand to the trial court to determine the amount of a reasonable fee
137. Pfohl v. Pfohl, 345 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
138. Demaso v. Demaso, 345 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977) (per curiam).
139. Monzon v. Monzon, 349 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977) (per curiam).
140. Johnson v. Johnson, 346 So. 2d 591 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977).
141. Patterson v. Patterson, 348 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977).
142. Dresser v. Dresser, 350 So. 2d 1152 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977).
143. Id.
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for the appellate services rendered and how much of the fee should
be paid by the opposing party.' Attorney's fees should not be
awarded to either party when both of them have substantial
wealth. 45
In a somewhat dubious opinion, it has been held by the District
Court of Appeal, Third District, that an attorney can sue his former
client for a fee based upon a fixed sum set in a contract, and if the
court finds that the contract does not exist because there was no
meeting of the minds the attorney may recover a larger sum based
upon a quantum meruit theory of recovery. 4 ' The dissenting opinion
pointed out that when the attorney has relied upon the alleged
contract and has gone to the jury on it, "the value therein that the
plaintiff has set upon his services is the maximum amount that he
can recover without proof of additional damages."'47
It is reversible error to award costs against a party in a dissolu-
tion proceeding in the absence of any motion to tax costs or any
documentation to sustain the award, since documentation is re-
quired under section 57.021 of the Florida Statutes (1977).'
A. Legislation
Under an amendment to section 59.46 of the Florida Statutes
(1977), any statute which provides for attorney's fees and any con-
tract entered into after October 1, 1977, which provides for attor-
ney's fees to the prevailing party shall be construed to include the
payment of attorney's fees to the prevailing party on appeal, in the
absence of an expressed contrary intent.46
VII. ANTENUPTIAL AND POSTNUPTIAL PROPERTY SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENTS
A. Antenuptial Agreements
In Howe v. Estate of Howe, 5 ' an antenuptial agreement pro-
vided that "should the marriage be dissolved within two years from
the date of the marriage ceremony," appellant would accept the
sum of $20,000 in lieu of her rights in and to the husband's real and
personal property including "dower, homestead and all other statu-
144. Id. at 1154.
145. Ross v. Ross, 341 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
146. Klarish v. Cypen, 343 So. 2d 1288, 1289 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977) (per curiam).
147. Id. at 1290 (Pearson, J., dissenting).
148. Bryan v. Bryan, 342 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977) (per curiam).
149. FLA. STAT. § 59.46 (1977).
150. 349 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977).
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tory rights and all other rights as widow or heir of Howard."' 5 ' The
husband died six months after the marriage. The issue at trial was
whether the phrase, "should the marriage be dissolved within two
years from the date of the marriage ceremony," was intended by the
parties to mean only dissolution of the marriage by divorce or was
intended to also include dissolution by death.' 2 The jury, after lis-
tening to conflicting testimony from the attorney who drew the
agreement, the decedent's children and the widow, determined that
the word "dissolved" included dissolution by death and found that
the widow had waived her right to dower.'53
B. Postnuptial Agreements
1. INVALIDATION AND ATTORNEY'S FEES
While a true reconciliation and resumption of marital relations
will invalidate a separation agreement between spouses, the mere
resumption of marital relations on an occasional basis will not do
so in the absence of proof of reconciliation.'54
If a property settlement agreement provides that the husband
will pay the wife's attorney's fees in any subsequent dissolution, it
is an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny her an award. In
light of the agreement, the wife's financial needs and the husband's
ability to pay are not relevant considerations.'
2. CONSTRUCTION OF AGREEMENTS
If a property settlement agreement provides that the husband
is to pay all reasonable and necesary medical and dental bills of the
wife, the trial court may not limit the amount of the husband's
liability for the medical bills if they are in fact reasonable and
necessary. 6 When a husband is obligated under a property settle-
ment to pay all taxes on the wife's alimony payments, he is not also
liable for payment of his wife's income taxes on wages she has
earned. "I
3. MODIFICATION PROBLEMS
In Goldin v. Goldin,' a formerly prosperous husband lost his
151. Id. at 1201.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1202.
154. Busot v. Busot, 338 So. 2d 1332 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
155. Borowiak v. Borowiak, 341 So. 2d 286 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977) (per curiam).
156. Rubio v. Rubio, 347 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977).
157. Id.
158. 346 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
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job while the formerly unemployable wife secured excellent employ-
ment and accumulated a sizeable bank account. As a result of the
drastic change in circumstances, the district court ordered that the
alimony provisions of the parties' separation agreement be termi-
nated, and not simply abated as ordered by the trial court. The
court said the termination was to be final, 5 ' thus preventing the
wife from coming into court at a future date to seek a modification
in her favor. The district court also held that the trial court was in
error in setting off against accrued and unpaid alimony the surren-
der value of a life insurance policy which had been given to the wife
under the terms of the separation agreement; the property rights of
the wife cannot be set off against the husband's accrued alimony
obligations.11°
While the Third District has continued to hold that the alimony
provisions of a "pure" property settlement agreement (wherein each
party relinquishes all claims against the other except as provided for
in that agreement) may not be modified at the request of either
party, '' the Second District has stated that such alimony provisions
may be modified,' but "[w]here the amount of alimony is based
upon agreement a heavier burden rests upon a party seeking a modi-
fication than would otherwise be required."' 63
In a true property settlement agreement wherein the wife gives
up property rights in return for periodic support payments, the hus-
band may not later seek modification of the amount of payments
upon the basis that at the time of the dissolution he thought that
his wife was suffering from a cardiac condition which would perma-
nently prevent her from becoming self-supporting."4 If his com-
plaint is based upon a unilateral mistake, the contract cannot be
reformed. If the complaint is based upon Florida Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 1.540,165 it must be filed within one year after the judgment is
entered; this complaint was filed four years after the judgment. In
a suit for reformation of a contract on grounds of mistake, the party
seeking reformation must show what the parties would have agreed
to had there been no mistake; there must be a definite prior agree-
159. Id. at 110.
160. Id. at 110-11.
161. White v. White, 338 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976); accord, Brisco v. Brisco, 355
So. 2d 506 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1978).
162. Freeland v. Purcifull, 347 So. 2d 726, 727 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977).
163. Scott v. Scott, 285 So. 2d 423, 424-25 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
164. Mills v. Mills, 339 So. 2d 681 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976) (per curiam).
165. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.540 provides that the court may relieve a party from a final
judgment by reason of mistake, but it specifies that a motion predicated upon mistake must
be made within one year after the judgment is entered.
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ment to which the instrument can be made to conform. Assuming
that the wife's cardiac condition is a mutual mistake of the parties,
the court has no way to rewrite the contract to set an amount of
alimony which would have been agreed upon if the parties had not
made this mistake.'"6
Even though a property settlement agreement expressly pro-
vides that it may not be modified except by a written agreement,
the parties may by their actions waive their rights under or orally
modify the agreement." 7
VIII. CUSTODY AND SUPPORT OF CHILDREN
A. Custody
1. DISCOVERY AND PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS
A trial court should not enter a protective order forbidding the
taking of a deposition from a wife's psychiatrist in a child custody
matter: (a) when the wife's counsel originally stipulated to the tak-
ing of the deposition; (b) when under section 90.242 of the Florida
Statutes (1977) any communication between a patient and her psy-
chiatrist is not privileged "in a criminal or civil proceeding in which
the patient introduces her mental conditions as an element of [her]
claim or defense,""' and the wife has alleged that she is fit to have
custody of a minor child; and (c) in any custody matter in which
the mental health of the parent is vital to a determination of perma-
nent custody."'
2. VISITATION RIGHTS
It is reversible error to grant visitation rights to nonparents of
a child whose custody has been awarded to a fit parent.70
3. MODIFICATION OF CUSTODY
In Behn v. Timmons,", custody of two minor girls had been
awarded to their mother who, during a period of illness, had deliv-
ered them to her former husband. The husband retained custody
until shortly before the mother's death, when the maternal grand-
166. 339 So. 2d at 684.
167. Wiener v. Wiener, 343 So. 2d 1319 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977) (per curiam).
168. FLA. STAT. § 90.242(3)(b) (1977).
169. Critchlow v. Critchlow, 347 So. 2d 453 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
170. Tamargo v. Tanargo, 348 So. 2d 1163 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977) (per curiam) (grant of
visitation rights to paternal grandparents reversed).
171. 345 So. 2d 388 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977).
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parents removed the children and took actual custody of them. The
father was held entitled to regain custody of his children absent
proof that he was unfit.
The welfare and best interests of the child are the paramount
issues in child custody matters. Thus, a trial court judge does not
necessarily abuse his discretion when he refuses to take custody
from the mother and grant it to the father upon evidence that the
mother cohabitated with a man to whom she was not married and
who lied about the relationship in court.' Such a refusal to take
custody away from the mother is justified when "to remove the child
from her present environment would serve only as a punishment to
the mother for her one indiscretion rather than as a change for the
best interests of the child."''
4. LEGISLATION
Florida has adopted the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
Act,' which should eliminate the unseemly behavior of many par-
ents in unilaterally removing children from the jurisdiction, or uni-
laterally bringing them into Florida with the intent to deprive a
court of jurisdiction over them in a dissolution action. Under the
Act, a Florida court can award custody of children to a parent in
Florida even though the other parent has removed the children from
the jurisdiction. If a parent has wrongfully taken his or her children
from their home state and brought them to Florida, the court may
decline jurisdiction because of this conduct. The "inconvenient
forum" concept is also recognized and described in detail in the
Act. 17
Section 61.20 of the Florida Statutes (1975) was amended in
1977. '" The section now provides that in any case involving custody,
the trial court may request the Department of Health and Rehabili-
tative Services or qualified staff of the court to make an investiga-
tion and social study concerning all pertinent details relating to the
children and parents.
172. Brock v. Brock, 349 So. 2d 782 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977).
173. Id. at 783.
174. FLA. STAT. §§ 61.1302-.1348 (1977). Space limitations do not permit a thorough
analysis of the Act which is primarily directed toward the question of jurisdiction over chil-
dren.
175. Id. § 61.1316.
176. 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-433 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 61.20 (1977)).
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B. Support
1. JURISDICTION
If a trial court reserves jurisdiction over the parties to award
child support in the future, a petition by the wife asking for child
support may be served upon the now nonresident husband by certi-
fied mail; formal service of process is not necessary because the
child support proceeding is a mere continuation of the original
case.177
A trial court which has entered a dissolution judgment contain-
ing provisions for child support has continuing jurisdiction over the
former husband.17 ' If he is extradited from another state to Florida
under the Uniform Interstate Extradition Act,'79 he can be served
with a writ of ne exeat while in custody despite section 941.25 of the
Florida Statutes (1977), which provides that a person brought into
the state by extradition based on a criminal charge shall not be
subject to service of process in civil actions arising out of the same
facts as the criminal action. This result is dictated by the fact that
the writ of ne exeat is ancillary to the original dissolution action
jurisdiction and the immunity statute cannot be construed so as to
protect a person from this original jurisdiction."0
When a trial judge recuses himself in a dissolution action be-
cause of his relationship to the parties, he may properly reserve
jurisdiction to act immediately on imminent matters such as tem-
porary alimony and child support. He may not, however, act in
contempt proceedings which take place four weeks after he has re-
cused himself."'
2. PROCEDURE
A husband who had filed an answer in a dissolution proceeding
admitting the paternity of a child was permitted on appeal to file
an amended answer denying paternity three days before the date set
for the trial. Because the proposed amended answer stated that the
wife had informed the husband that he was not the father, there was
no danger that the denial of paternity at such a late date would
come as a surprise to the wife." 2
177. Camerano v. Camerano, 340 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
178. Pifer v. Pifer, 349 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977).
179. FLA. STAT. §§ 941.01-.42 (1977).
180. 349 So. 2d at 780.
181. State ex rel. Cobb v. Bailey, 349 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977).
182. Bostwick v. Bostwick, 346 So. 2d 150 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977).
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3. ENFORCEMENT
The Supreme Court of Florida, in reversing the District Court
of Appeal, First District, held that in contempt proceedings against
a husband for failure to pay support the trial court, before entering
an order of contempt, must make an affirmative finding that the
contemnor has the ability to pay and wilfully refuses to do so, or
that he previously had the ability to pay but divested himself of that
ability through his own fault or neglect so as to frustrate the support
order.'8 3
In contempt proceedings for failure to pay child support, a trial
court judge abused his discretion when he refused to permit the
alleged contemnor to introduce evidence that his former wife would
not allow him visitation privileges as provided in the divorce decree.
It was deemed a further abuse to deny the alleged contemnor an
opportunity to present evidence in support of the affirmative de-
fense of laches.'8 4
In the absence of compelling or extraordinary circumstances, a
trial court commits reversible error when it fails to enforce the pay-
ment of overdue alimony and child support against a defaulting
husband. "
Section 61.12 of the Florida Statutes (1977) permits garnish-
ment to enforce orders for accrued alimony, suit money, child sup-
port and "other orders in proceedings for dissolution, alimony or
child support.""' This same language in the prior section 61.12 of
the Florida Statutes (1975) was interpreted by the court in Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. Payne'7 to include an order awarding at-
torney's fees in a dissolution proceeding. The court ordered garnish-
ment of twenty-five percent of the delinquent husband's disposable
earnings, the maximum amount permitted under the Federal Truth
in Lending Act,' s in order to enforce a divorce decree awarding child
support and attorney's fees to the wife. The court noted that future
wages could not be garnished, but said that the husband's agree-
ment in open court to have amounts withheld from future earnings
for the purpose of complying with the prior court orders constituted
a valid assignment of wages.'
183. Faircloth v. Faircloth, 339 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 1976), rev'g 321 So. 2d 87 (Fla. 1st Dist.
1975); accord, Pearce v. Pearce, 341 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977).
184. Phillips v. Adams, 339 So. 2d 665 (Fla, 4th Dist. 1976).
185. Smithwich v. Smithwick, 343 So. 2d 945 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977) (per curiam).
186. FLA. STAT. § 61.12(1) (1977).
187. 345 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
188. 15 U.S.C. § 1673 (1976).
189. 345 So. 2d at 731-32.
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Under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act,'90
a court does not have the power to condition an award of support
upon the mother, who resides in Texas with her child, permitting
the child to visit his father in Florida. The Act is concerned solely
with support duties."'
The District Courts of Appeal, First, Third and Fourth Dis-
tricts, have agreed that a father can be compelled to maintain life
insurance as security for the payment of child support, but he can-
not be compelled to maintain a life insurance policy as an estate for
the benefit of the child over and above the support payments. 12
4. MODIFICATION OF SUPPORT
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, held that a par-
ent's duty to support an adult child's education terminated at age
twenty-one" 3 even though a Pennsylvania court had ordered the
husband to continue payments after the son reached the age of
twenty-two." 4 Comity between states was not at issue since the
entire matter of the dissolution of the marriage was submitted by
both parties to the Florida court."'
It is reversible error for a trial court to refuse to increase an
alimony and child support award entered in 1963 when the wife's
income has remained constant, the child's needs have increased, the
husband's income has increased from $112,000 to $250,000 per year,
and inflation has caused a rise of 68.3% in the cost of basic items
during the decade subsequent to the granting of the divorce de-
cree." It is also reversible error, however, for a court to order an
automatic five percent cost of living increase in child support."7
The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, refused to allow
a reduction of alimony and child support despite the fact that two
of the three children involved were no longer in the custody of their
mother." 8 The court found the most material change of circumstan-
190. FLA. STAT. §§ 88.011-.371 (1977).
191. Grosse v. Grosse, 347 So. 2d 1099 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977).
192. Higgins v. Higgins, 348 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977) (per curiam); see Lithgow v.
Lithgow, 340 So. 2d 1283 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977) (per curiam); Eberly v. Eberly, 344 So. 2d 886
(Fla. 4th Dist. 1977); Riley v. Riley, 131 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1961).
193. In fact, the obligation to support terminates when the child becomes 18 although a
court may require support for a dependent beyond that age. FLA. STAT. § 743.07 (1977). This
error was probably harmless in light of the circumstances.
194. Winikoff v. Winikoff, 339 So. 2d 262 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976) (per curiam).
195. Id. at 263.
196. Pope v. Pope, 342 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977).
197. Richter v. Richter, 344 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977) (per curiam).
198. Peterson v. Peterson, 345 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977).
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ces to be the doubling of the husband's salary since the time of the
settlement agreement.'99
It was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court, in Frumkes
v. Frumkes, °2 ° to refuse to modify a support order at the request of
the husband who had custody and who sought to compel the wife
to contribute to the support. In Frumkes, neither the husband's
income nor the children's needs had substantially increased; the
former wife had remarried and was operating a very marginal busi-
ness with her new husband.
In the event that a dissolution judgment, in accordance with a
separation agreement, provides that the duty of the father to sup-
port his children continues until they reach maturity, marry, or
become self-supporting, this duty to support will terminate as soon
as each child becomes self-supporting, and the father need not file
for a modification on this ground.2 ' Furthermore, if one of the chil-
dren takes up residence with the father and he petitions for the
elimination of a duty to make payments while he has the child, any
such modification made dates from the filing of the petition.202 The
wife will not be entitled to enforce the duty of support under the
prior judgment by bringing contempt proceedings for payments
accruing after the child's change of residence.203
IX. ADOPTION
According to the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, tem-
porary failures and derelictions by natural parents which might
justify a court in taking children from their custody do not support
a judgment of adoption by strangers.2 0' In another adoption case, Ex
rel. Baby Boy S.,205 a natural father who showed interest in the
future of his child had custody taken from him and given to a child-
placement agency as the partial result of a written report prepared
by the agency, assessing the father's fitness as a parent. The court
considered the report without apprising the father of its existence
or its contents. The appellate court held that the father had been
denied procedural due process, and reversed the order committing
the child to the agency for adoption.
A natural parent may not be deprived of his child in adoption
199. Id.
200. 349 So. 2d 823 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
201. Patterson v. Patterson, 348 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977).
202. Id. at 595.
203. Id.
204. In re Adoption of Noble, 349 So. 2d 1215 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977).
205. 349 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977).
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proceedings merely upon the basis that he has failed to make regular
support payments for the child.2"0 As stated by the court in In re
Adoption of Gossett:"0 7
[A] natural parent should not be deprived of the privileges and
responsibilies of parenthood unless in some fashion he has aban-
doned his child or otherwise demonstrated that he is not a fit
subject to continue to enjoy the privilege. . . . [E]ven though
temporary failures and derelictions of parents may justify tempo-
rary deprivation of the custody of their children, it will seldom
justify the permenant deprivation of parental rights resulting
from the finality of an adoption decree.0 8
According to recent case law, a father in adoption proceedings
will not be deemed to have abandoned his child when the facts show
that he was in constant communication with the child, that he made
support payments (although not in total compliance with a court
order), that he terminated support payments in an effort to have his
former wife communicate with him, and that he used diligent efforts
to locate his child after learning of his former wife's death."'9
Although the circuit courts in Florida are often divided into
divisions (such as the juvenile division, the probate division, etc.),
these divisions are merely administrative and not jurisdictional.
Every circuit judge in each circuit is authorized to exercise that
circuit court's jurisdiction in all divisions. Hence, it is reversible
error for a probate judge to hold that he had no jurisdiction over an
adoption proceeding and that the juvenile and family division
should hear the case. 210
A petition for adoption of an adult which fails to show that the
natural parents have consented to the adoption or were served with
process is subject to dismissal for lack of diligent prosecution.,
Section 63.162(2) of the Florida Statutes (1975) has been inter-
preted to mean that an emancipated adopted child who seeks to
have the court order the production of the medical backgrounds of
her natural parents must show good cause for the request. The stat-
ute does not specify a good cause requirement, but a court has held
that it is implicit therein."'
A judgment'of adoption may not be entered in favor of a mar-
206. Durden v. Henry, 343 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. lt Dist. 1977).
207. 277 So. 2d 832 (Fla. lst Dist. 1973).
208. Id. at 834.
209. In re Adoption of Lewis, 340 So. 2d 126 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
210. In re Guardianship of Bentley, 342 So. 2d 1045 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977).
211. In re Adoption of Scott, 344 So. 2d 884 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977).
212. In re Adoption of Rand, 347 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
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ried woman when her husband neither joins in the adoption petition
nor consents to the adoption, and the court fails to excuse the lack
of consent under section 63.042(2)(d) of the Florida Statutes
(1975).213
Grandparents who were petitioning to adopt their grandson
who had lived with them since his birth were held entitled to a
hearing on their petition. It was reversible error for the court to
dismiss the petition summarily without granting this hearing.21 1
A. Legislation
Section 63.042 of the Florida Statutes (1975) was amended to
state that homosexuals are ineligible to adopt under the adoption
statute.215 Another amendment to the adoption laws requires that in
all adoption proceedings in which the petition is dismissed, the
court must state with specificity the reasons for such dismissal!"6
Florida's adoption statutes were further amended in 1977 to
provide that when a child has previously been committed to either
a licensed child-placement agency or to the Department of Health
and Rehabilitative Services, consent to adoption may be given by
the agency or department as the case may be.217 In addition, if any
of the papers and records pertaining to an adoption are sought to
be made subject to inspection, the agency or department may pres-
ent a report on the advisability of disclosing or not disclosing the
information requested. 218 The birth certificate statutes were
amended by the same legislation to permit access to original birth
records by adoptive children of legal age only upon order of the
court.21
9
Under another amendment to the Florida Statutes, any crip-
pled child who has been provided with medical care or treatment
from the state prior to being adopted shall continue to be eligible
for this care after his adoption, regardless of the financial ability of
the persons adopting the child. 22 Also, the definition of a "special
213. In re Interest of W.L.C., 348 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977). FLA. STAT. § 63.042(2)(d)
(1977) provides in pertinent part that a married person may adopt without the other spouse
joining as a petitioner if "[the failure of the other spouse to join in the petition or to consent
to the adoption is excused by the court for reason of prolonged unexplained absence, unavaila-
bility, incapacity, or circumstances constituting an unreasonable withholding of consent."
214. In re Adoption of Coleman, 349 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977).
215. 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-140, § 1 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3) (1977)).
216. Id. § 3 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 63.142(3)(b) (1977)).
217. Id. ch. 77-446, § 1 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 63.062(3) (1977)).
218. Id. § 2 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 63.162(2) (1977)).
219. Id. §§ 3 & 4 (current versions at FLA. STAT. §§ 382.17(l)-(2), .22 (1977)).
220. Id. ch. 77-159, § 1 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 391.07(2) (1977)).
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needs child" has been amended to include "a member of a sibling
group of any age, provided two or more members of a sibling group
remain together for purposes of adoption.""22
X. JUVENILES
A. Dependent Children
Section 827.05 of the Florida Statutes (1975), which makes it a
second degree misdemeanor for a person negligently to deprive a
child or to allow a child to be deprived of "necessary food, clothing,
shelter, or medical treatment," has been held unconstitutionally
vague, indefinite and overbroad by the Supreme Court of Florida in
a well-reasoned case.222
A statute pertaining to the judicial treatment of juveniles,
which defines an "ungovernable child" as "a child who persistently
disobeys the reasonable and lawful demands of his parents or other
legal custodians and is beyond their control," '223 has been upheld by
the Supreme Court of Florida in Ex rel. Hutchins124 over the conten-
tion that it was unconstitutionally vague and indefinite. The court's
opinion in Hutchins is noticeably lacking in reasons for the decision.
In the same case, the court further noted that the statute in question
provides that the first time a child is adjudicated as ungovernable
he may be defined and treated as a dependent child, and if he is
adjudicated for the second and subsequent times he may be defined
and treated as a delinquent child.25 The court held that since the
first hearing is not necessarily the first step in the adjudication of
delinquency, it is not necessary to have an attorney represent a child
at this hearing.226 However, if the results of the first hearing are to
be used in a second hearing in which a child's status may change
from dependent to delinquent, the first hearing becomes a critical
first step in the delinquency determination, and the child is thus
221. Id. ch. 77-293, § 1 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 409.166(2)(a) (1977)).
222. State v. Winters, 346 So. 2d 991 (Fla. 1977). The legislature has since amended this
section, 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-429, § 2, as follows:
Negligent treatment of children.-whoever, though financially able, negli-
gently deprives a child of, or allows a child to be deprived of, necessary food,
clothing, shelter, or medical treatment or permits a child to live in an environ-
ment when such deprivation or environment causes the child's physical or emo-
tional health to be significantly impaired or is in danger of being significantly
impaired shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree . . ..
FLA. STAT. § 827.05 (1977) (emphasis indicates amended portion).
223. FLA. STAT. § 39.01(11) (1975).
224. 345 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1977).
225. Id. at 706; see FLA. STAT. § 39.01(11) (1977).
226. 345 So. 2d at 706.
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entitled to aid of counsel. 27 Consequently, the results of a first hear-
ing cannot be used at a second hearing unless the child is given the
right to an attorney (or provided with counsel if indigent) at the first
hearing. 2u Justice Sundberg, dissenting, pointed out the utter un-
workability of the majority's interpretation as well as its apparently
askew reading of the statutory sections at issue.2
In a companion case2 10 to Hutchins, the court held that if the
first ungovernable child petition is filed in contemplation of delin-
quency proceedings, the court must instruct the child as to his right
to counsel or provide counsel if the child is indigent. In light of these
two cases, unless the prosecuting authorities are able to predict the
future, they will have to ask the court to appoint an attorney for the
first hearing. If counsel is not appointed, it will require at least three
hearings to adjudicate an ungovernable child as delinquent.23'
B. Delinquency and Criminal Proceedings
In Smith v. State,13 2 a juvenile lied under oath about her name,
age and arrest record to avoid being sent to a Youth Hall and for
the specific purpose of being placed on probation. The District
Court of Appeal, Third District, held that the sixteen year old girl,
in lying about her age, had voluntarily submitted herself to the
jurisdiction of the circuit court's adult division. Having accepted
the benefits of probation, the juvenile was held estopped from chal-
lenging the jurisdiction of the adult division in subsequent proceed-
ings to revoke her probation. 233
In reconciling a split of opinion among the district courts, the
Supreme Court of Florida has held that when a petition alleging
delinquency is not filed within thirty days from the date a complaint
is received by an intake officer, a dismissal of the complaint is
mandatory. 34
A circuit court may reconsider its prior order waiving jurisdic-
tion over a juvenile and certifying him for trial as an adult when
227. Id.
228. Id. at 707.
229. Id. at 708-09 (Sundberg, J., dissenting in part).
230. Ex rel. C.F., 345 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 1977).
231. It should be noted that the Supreme Court of Florida has adopted new Rules of
Juvenile Procedure and Forms, effective July 1, 1977. In re Florida Rules of Juvenile Proce-
dure, 345 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 1977). Space limitations do not permit discussion of the 48 pages
of rules and forms; the reader is advised to examine the Committee Notes for explanations
of changes. See 345 So. 2d 655 passim.
232. 345 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977) (per curiam).
233. Id. at 1082.
234. Ex rel. S.R. v. State, 346 So. 2d 1018 (Fla. 1977), quashing 336 So. 2d 662 (Fla. 2d
Dist. 1976), aff'g Ex rel. S.L.M., 336 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
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there is evidence which shows reasonable prospects for rehabilita-
tion, and the original order failed to state reasons why the best
interests of the public would require a waiver of juvenile jurisdic-
tion.2 3
Under section 39.10(5) of the Florida Statutes (1977), an adju-
dication of delinquency shall not be deemed a conviction of a crime.
Hence, a witness, and especially a witness who is the defendant,
may not be impeached by a showing of a prior adjudication of delin-
quency.
231
Section 231.07 of the Florida Statutes (1977) makes it a second
degree misdemeanor to create a disturbance on the property or
grounds of a school, but this section "shall not apply to any pupil
in or subject to the discipline of a school." '237 This exclusionary prov-
iso has been held to apply only to a pupil subject to the discipline
of the school where the wrongful act is committed and not to all
pupils, including those of other schools.21'
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, has held that it
is a denial of due process of law, and reversible error, for a trial court
in delinquency proceedings to refuse to allow counsel for a juvenile
to present closing arguments.13'
Rule 8.080(3) of the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure pro-
vides that in delinquency proceedings the alleged delinquent minor,
in conjunction with the Division of Youth Services, may submit to
the court a suggested plan for his treatment and conduct. It has
been held that the court's acceptance of the proposed plan is not
contingent upon the agreement of the State Attorney, who may
submit arguments to the court against the adoption of the plan. 4"
When the trial court record of a delinquency proceeding fails to
show either that the juvenile was fully informed of his constitutional
right to be represented by an attorney or that the juvenile made a
knowing and intelligent waiver of this right, the adjudication of
delinquency must be reversed.'
The Supreme Court of Florida has held that when the legisla-
ture enacted the juvenile delinquency laws,"2 it did not intend for
the common law rebuttable presumption that a child between the
235. State v. D.R.S., 344 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977).
236. Ex rel. I.S.H., 344 So. 2d 1295 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977).
237. FLA. STAT. § 231.07 (1977).
238. Ex rel. D.F.P. 345 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977).
239. E.V.R. v. State, 342 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
240. Ex rel. J.R.M., 340 So. 2d 937 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976), aff'd per curiam, 346 So, 2d
1033 (Fla. 1977).
241. Ex rel. D.C.T., 347 So. 687 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977) (per curiam).
242. FA. STAT. §§ 39.001-.337 (1977).
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ages of seven and fourteen is incapable of committing a crime to
operate in delinquency proceedings. In arriving at its conclusion, the
court noted that the delinquency statutes speak of violations of law
rather than crimes and that application of the common law pre-
sumption would tend to frustrate the statutes' purpose of extending
remedial aid to delinquent children. 43
In the absence of any proof that a car is stolen, the mere fact
that a juvenile pushing an allegedly stolen car flees from the scene
upon the arrival of the police does not establish criminal conduct
and the juvenile may not be adjudged delinquent. "
Section 39.03(2) of the Florida Statutes (1977) provides that a
person taking a child into custody in a juvenile delinquency pro-
ceeding "shall, within three days, make a full written report to the
appropriate officer." This statute has been held to be mandatory
with the result that if there is more than a three day delay, the
juvenile must be discharged.2"
Section 39.05(1) of the Florida Statutes (1977) requires that a
petition for an adjudication of delinquency be filed by the state
attorney. Hence, a petition filed by some other person asking that
a minor be adjudicated a delinquent child is defective and does not
permit the court to adjudicate him delinquent.2" Furthermore, a
petition seeking an adjudication that a child is delinquent must
allege that the child has been previously adjudicated an ungoverna-
ble child. 47
A child who escapes from a juvenile detention center cannot be
convicted of the crime of escape because the escape statute4 8 applies
only to escapes from penal institutions, while section 416.06 of the
Florida Statutes (1977) provides that a detention home shall not be
deemed a penal instittuion.2 "1
The state's burden of showing that a juvenile has knowingly
waived his Miranda rights before giving a confession has not been
met when the facts indicate that the juvenile was fourteen years old,
that he had below average intelligence and the reading ability of a
child entering the first grade, that he had difficulty understanding
normal speech, and that his parents were not notified.10 On the
other hand, the mere fact that a minor's parents or legal guardians
243. State v. D.H., 340 So. 2d 1163, 1165 (Fla. 1976).
244. G.A.D. v. State, 340 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976) (per curiam).
245. Ex rel. J.W.H. v. State, 345 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977).
246. Ex rel. D.T.H. v. State, 348 So. 2d 1155, 1157 (Fla. 1977).
247. Id. at 1157.
248. FLA. STAT. § 944.40 (1977).
249. Ex rel. F.G., 349 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977) (per curiam).
250. Tennell v. State, 348 So. 2d 937 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977).
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are not notified 5' that the minor has been taken into custody will
not invalidate a confession made after the minor is taken into cus-
tody and prior to notification being given.252
In a similar vein, the mere fact that the arresting officer fails
to "without unreasonable delay, deliver the child to the appropriate
intake officer"23 does not call for suppression of a confession pro-
cured duriing the delay. The totality of the circumstances surround-
ing the confession must be considered by the trial court to ascertain
the voluntary nature of the confession; mere delay is not enough to
invalidate it.211
In State Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v.
Golden,2 1 the Supreme Court of Florida held that sections
39.03(5)(a) and (b) of the Florida Statutes (1975), which deal with
the place of commitment or detention of a child ordered by a judge,
provide directory rather than mandatory guidelines for the judiciary
and thus do not unconstitutionally interfere with the judiciary. 26
In the same case, the court resolved a conflict between sections
39.03(7)(a) and (b) of the Florida Statutes (1975) and Rules 8.050(a)
and (c) of the Rules of Juvenile Procedure. Both the statutory sec-
tions and the rules cited concern the period of time a juvenile may
be detained prior to a judicial hearing. Sections 39.03(7)(a) and (b)
require an initial appearance within twenty-four hours and an adju-
dicatory hearing within fourteen days; Rules of Juvenile Procedure
8.050(a) and (c) require an initial appearnce within forty-eight
hours and an adjudicatory hearing within thirty days. The court
upheld the statutory sections as constitutional on the ground that
since the statutes at issue deal with substantive rights which are
within the control of the legislature, they prevail over court rules,
which should be amended to coincide with them."7
C. Legislation
Under a new statute, 255 any person who commits any act which
causes or tends to cause or to encourage a child to become a delin-
quent or a dependent or any person who by acts, threats, commands
251. FA. STAT. § 39.03(3)(a) (1977) requires that the person taking the child into custody
immediately notify the child's parents or legal custodians.
252. Doerr v. State, 348 So. 2d 938 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977) (per curiam), question certified
to the Supreme Court of Florida.
253. FLA. STAT. § 39.03(3)(a) (1977).
254. Ex rel. W.J.N., 350 So. 2d 119 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977).
255. 350 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 1976).
256. Id. at 345-46.
257. Id. at 347.
258. FiA. STAT. § 827.04(3) (1977).
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or persuasion induces or endeavors to induce a child to perform any
act which would cause him to become or to continue to be delin-
quent or dependent will be guilty of a first degree misdemeanor. An
addition to Florida's mental health laws now permits the Depart-
ment of Health and Rehabilitative Services to purchase the services
of approved residential care facilities for "psychotic or severely dis-
turbed" children.2 59
Under a statute relating to courses of study and instructional
aids, specialized educational materials and services are now to be
supplied to exceptional children as well as to those who are visually
handicapped.2 0 A preamble to the legislature's enactment of the
amended statute indicates that "exceptional children" are those
with physical handicaps and specific learning disabilities .2 1
Children who are ordered to participate in or who volunteer to
participate in any work program for a state, county, municipal or
community service organization shall be considered employees of
these entities and shall be covered by workmen's compensation in-
surance; however, it appears that such children are to be denied any
compensation for disability under section 440.15 of the Florida Stat-
utes (1977).22
When a public defender is appointed to represent a minor child
in a circuit court or in any criminal proceeding in any other court,
the parents of the minor child are now liable up to a maximum of
$750.00 for the costs of such representation. The cost award is to be
a lien against the real and personal property of the parents, but the
lien cannot be enforced against the homestead.
The school trespass statute was amended to provide that stu-
dents currently under suspension or expulsion will be guilty of a
misdemeanor of the second degree if they come onto school grounds
or remain on the grounds and commit any act which disrupts the
orderly conduct of the activities of the campus. It is also a second
degree misdemeanor for such persons to remain on the school
grounds after being ordered to leave by the chief administrative
officer or his designee.26 '
Any county may now establish a commuility arbitration pro-
gram in which a community juvenile arbitrator or arbitration panel
may informally hear cases involving the alleged commission of cer-
259. d. § 394.4781.
260. Id. § 233.056(1).
261. 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-36.
262. FLA. STAT. § 39.11(9) (1977); see id. §§ 440.01-.58.
263. Id. §§ 27.56(1).(2).
264. Id. § 228.091.
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tain offenses by children. The arbitrator or arbitration panel will be
limited to hearing cases involving those misdemeanors and viola-
tions of local ordinances which have been determined to be subject
to community arbitration. The determination of which violations
and misdemeanors are subject to arbitration is to be agreed upon
in writing by the state attorney, the senior circuit court judge as-
signed to juvenile cases in the circuit and the Department of Health
and Rehabilitative Services. The new program is designed to reduce
juvenile crime and to allow the judicial system to deal effectively
with more serious cases.2"'
XI. GUARDIANSHIP
A. Incompetency Proceedings
1. JURISDICTION
In Bettison v. Bettison,211 a son had been appointed as guardian
of his father's property. When the father was restored to legal com-
petency, the son surrendered the guardianship assets, filed an ac-
counting and petitioned for discharge. The father objected to cer-
tain items on the accounting, and as a result the guardianship pro-
ceeding remained an open matter. Subsequently, the father at-
tempted to initiate suit against the son for certain defalcations by
simply mailing the son a complaint and notice of hearing. The court
held that the father could not secure jurisdiction over the son-
guardian without proper service of process upon him, because the
complaint alleged was unrelated to the guardianship proceeding.6 7
2. PROCEEDINGS
Although an individual's guardian may neither initiate nor
maintain dissolution of marriage proceedings, he may initiate pro-
ceedings to modify a separate maintenance award previously en-
tered against the ward when the ward is no longer able to pay his
obligations because of his mental incompetency.2"'
In In re Castro,2 1 the trial court found that a mother was fit to
be appointed the guardian of property her two infant daughters had
inherited upon their father's death. However, since the mother was
alleged to have killed the father, the court instead appointed an
265. Id. §§ 39.33-.337.
266. 345 So. 2d 405 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977).
267. Id. at 407.
268. Cohen v. Cohen, 346 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977).
269. 344 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977).
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attorney as guardian. The district court held that where the mother
was found to be fit and qualified it was reversible error not to ap-
point her as guardian even though a potential conflict existed be-
cause the mother allegedly killed the father.270
In accordance with section 744.331(4) of the Florida Statutes
(1977), it has been held that when an examination committee has
found that an alleged incompetent is not mentally or physically
incompetent, the trial court must dismiss the petition over the pro-
tests of the petitioners.27" '
In setting the amount of a fee award to an attorney for his work
as attorney for the estate and as guardian for the property of the
ward, it is reversible error for the trial court to consider only the
amount of cash in the estate and to ignore other assets which can
be liquidated over a period of time. 72
The Supreme Court of Florida, in 1977, adopted revised Florida
Rules of Probate and Guardianship Procedure;273 No substantive
revisions, however, were made in the temporary guardianship rules
adopted in 1975.74
3. INVOLUNTARY HOSPITALIZATION
The Supreme Court of Florida has upheld the constitutionality
of section 394.467 of the Florida Statutes (1977), which provides for
the involuntary hospitalization of mentally ill persons. The statute
states that
[a] person may be involuntarily hospitalized if he is mentally ill
and because of his illness is:
(a) Likely to injure himself or others if allowed to remain
at liberty, or
(b) In need of care or treatment and lacks sufficient capac-
ity to make a responsible application on his own behalf.7
The court in In re Beverlyrn held that these standards are suffi-
ciently precise and adequately within constitutional requirements
to warn a person that he will be subject to involuntary commitment
if he falls within either of the two categories. The court further noted
270. Id. at 271.
271. In re Keene, 343 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977).
272. In re Guardianship of Berg, 348 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977).
273. In re Supplemental Petition for Changes in Florida Rules of Probate and Guardian-
ship Procedure, 344 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 1977) (per curiam).
274. In re Florida Rules of Probate and Guardianship Procedure, 324 So. 2d 38 (Fla.
1975) (per curiam).
275. FLA. STAT. § 394.467(1) (1977).
276. In re Beverly, 342 So. 2d 481, 485 (Fla. 1977).
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that, although the statute is silent regarding the burden of proof, the
burden to apply in civil commitment proceedings is "clear and con-
vincing evidence" and not "proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 277
Although an alleged incompetent has the right to counsel at all
judicial proceedings, the court held that he does not have the right
to counsel during psychiatric interviews and that he may not claim
a patient-psychiatrist privilege as to communications made to a
psychiatrist under sections 90.243(3)(a) and 394.467(3)(a) of the
Florida Statutes (1975).111 Finally, it was held that an alleged in-
competent does not have the right to Miranda warnings since he is
not being charged with a crime.279
It is to be noted that under the decision in In re Beverly and
the holdings in companion cases280 the record must show by clear
and convincing evidence that it is necessary to deprive the alleged
incompetent of his liberty in order to prevent him from injuring
himself or others, or that he lacks sufficient capacity to make a
responsible application on his own behalf. If less restrictive mea-
sures are available, an order of involuntary commitment will be
reversed .281
The Supreme Court of Florida has also upheld the constitution-
ality of section 394.467 of the Florida Statutes (1975) by holding
that the proceedings for the involuntary hospitalization of a person
for mental incompetency do not require a jury trial under the United
States and Florida Constitutions; it is not a denial of equal protec-
tion of the law under either constitution to deny a jury trial in this
instance."'
4. LEGISLATION
Under a newly created statute,28 3 mace and other chemical
agents may be used against a patient housed in a forensic unit 28 ' in
277. Id. at 488.
278. Id. at 489.
279. Id. at 488-49.
280. In re Smith, 342 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 1977); In re Jackson, 342 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 1977);
In re Alvarez, 342 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 1977).
281. 342 So. 2d at 490.
282. In re Jones, 339 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 1976).
283. FLA. STAT. § 394.4671 (1977).
284. "Forensic unit" means a secure mental health facility which is used for
any patient:
1. Who has been determined to need treatment for a mental illness;
2. Who:
a. Has charges pending;
b. Has been convicted of a criminal offense;
c. Has been acquitted by reason of insanity of a criminal offense; or
d. Is serving a sentence for a criminal offense; and
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cases of emergency and when necessary to provide protection and
security to any patient or to the personnel, equipment, buildings or
grounds of a facility.
Several of Florida's guardianship statutes have recently been
amended. The provisions relating to powers of the guardian upon
court approval" 5 and powers of the guardian without court ap.
proval 81 have been changed so that certain acts which previously
required a court's approval may now be performed without such
approval, while other acts which previously did not need court ap-
proval now require such approval. The natural guardians of minor
children may now receive, manage and dispose of real as well as
personal property, without appointment, authority or bond, when
the amount does not exceed $5,000.87
Under the "Durable Family Power of Attorney" section of the
Florida Statutes,18 a brother or sister may now be appointed as an
attorney.
XII. ILLEGITIMACY
A married woman may testify as to the nonaccess of her hus-
band during the time that her children were conceived and born.
She may also testify that her children are the illegitimate offspring
of another in order for them to inherit from the putative father who
acknowledged his paternity in signed life insurance application
forms .1 9
When a child is born during a marriage, one of the strongest
rebuttable presumptions existing in law is that the child is legiti-
mate. In Blitch v. Blitch,90 a child was born 228 days after the
marriage of the parties and at least 242 days after the parties first
had intercourse. In court, the husband's grandmother and his sister
testified that the wife had repeatedly stated that her husband was
not the father of her child. The wife, upon advice of counsel, refused
to answer several questions concerning the child's legitimacy on
3. Who has been determined by the Department of Health and Rehabilita-
tive Services:
a. To be dangerous to himself or others; or
b. To present a clear and present potential to escape.
Id. § 394.4671(1)(c).
285. 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-174, § 1; ch. 77-328, § 2 (current version at FLA. STAT. §
744.441 (1977)).
286. Id. ch. 77-328, § 3 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 744.444 (1977)).
287. Id. ch. 77-190, § 1 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 744.301(2) (1977)).
288. FLA. STAT. § 709.08(i) (1977).
289. In re Estate v. Jerrido, 339 So. 2d 237 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
290. 341 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
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fifth amendment grounds. The court found the child to be legiti-
mate, stating that "[p]roof necessary to overcome this strong pre-
sumption must be more than an emotional outburst by the wife to
the effect that the husband is not the father of the child."2 '
Under section 382.22 of the Florida Statutes (1977), the Depart-
ment of Health and Rehabilitative Services can be compelled by a
court to provide an individual with a copy of his original birth
certificate showing the names of his natural parents, even though
the natural parents may wish to keep their identity confidential.2 2
The former Florida Probate Code provided that an illegitimate
child could not be an heir of his father unless his father signed a
written acknowledgment of parentage in the presence of one compe-
tent witness.393 The new Probate Code provides that the paternity
of the father may be established by an adjudication before or after
the death of the father; the requirement for a written acknowledg-
ment has been repealed.2' It has been held in a case of first impres-
sion that the new Florida Probate Code governs the adjudication of
paternity of a putative father who has died prior to the new code's
enactment. 5
A natural father of illegitimate children who has stipulated that
he would furnish support for each child until the child reached the
age of twenty-one will not be relieved of his obligation by virtue of
the fact that the age of majority has been reduced to eighteen.96
The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, has upheld on
equal protection grounds the right of a father to bring a wrongful
death action for the death of his illegitimate child.2 1
XIII. TORTS
The Supreme Court of Florida has held that there is no cause
of action for the wrongful death of a viable fetus since a fetus is not
a "person" whose death gives a right of action under section 768.19
of the Florida Statutes (1975).2ss The court noted that case law had
denied a right of recovery for the wrongful death of a fetus under
prior statutes. The legislature, in adopting section 768.19 in 1972,
291. Id. at 253.
292. State Dep't of Health & Rehab. Serv. v. Mullarkey, 340 So. 2d 123 (Fla. 1st Dist.
1976) (construing FLA. STAT. § 382.27 (1975)).
293. FLA. STAT. § 731.29 (1973) (current version at Id. § 732.108 (1977)).
294. 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-87 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 732.108(2) (1977)).
295. Tenopir v. Boles Estate, 342 So. 2d 130. (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977).
296. Aumaitre v. Troyanos, 344 So. 2d 910 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
297. Wilcox v. Jones, 346 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977).
298. Stem v. Miller, 348 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 1977).
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did so with an awareness of the judiciary's construction of it.",
Section 48.04(1) of the Florida Statutes (1977) states that when
serving process against a minor who has never been married, a pro-
cess server must read the process to the minor to be served. A
process server's statement that "[tihese are papers of someone
suing you"3 is not in compliance with statute and hence the service
is insufficient.3'
In Ladies Center of Clearwater, Inc. v. Reno,30 1 a clinic and a
doctor were sued on grounds of negligence in committing an unsuc-
cessful abortion. The defendants sought indemnification from the
unwed father, alleging his neligent failure to employ a method of
contraception. The court determined that the impregnation by the
unwed father was "but the philosophical cause and not the legal
proximate cause of the alleged damage ' 313 and denied the doctor
and clinic a right of indemnification or contribution against the
father.
An eighteen year old son is not a minor and is not entitled to
recover damages for loss of parental guidance, and mental pain and
suffering incurred as the result of the wrongful death of his father.30 '
Similarly, the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, has held
that parents of an adult child do not have a cause of action for
mental pain and anguish resulting from his wrongful death.3 11
A mother cannot successfully sue her child after he becomes an
adult for injuries caused by his negligent driving while he was seven-
teen years old and unemancipated. 301
In Paoli v. Shor,307 the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District,
held that the common law rule of interspousal immunity does not
affect the right to contribution under the Uniform Contribution
Among Tortfeasors Act.38 Thus, where a tortfeasor brought suit
seeking contribution from the wife of the injured party as a joint
tortfeasor, the interspousal immunity doctrine did not cut off the
tortfeasor's right to contribution. The court in Paoli, noting that its
opinion was in conflict with that of the First District Court of Ap-
299. Id. at 307-08.
300. Jones v. Lucks, 349 So. 2d 691, 692 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977).
301. Id. at 692.
302. 341 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977) (per curiam).
303. Id. at 544.
304. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Furman, 341 So. 2d 1056 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
305. Wojcik v. United Serv. Auto. Ass'n, 347 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977); accord,
Bassett v. Merlin, Inc., 335 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 1976).
306. Torres v. Allstate Ins. Co., 345 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
307. 345 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977).
308. FLA. STAT. § 768.31 (1977).
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peal in Mieure v. Moore, 9  certified to the Supreme Court of Florida
the question of whether the common law doctrine of interspousal
immunity controls over the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfea-
sors Act."'
A circuit court in Florida has the inherent right to protect mi-
nors; therefore, it may determine whether a contingent fee contract
signed on behalf of a minor in a tort action is reasonable. In its
determination, the court must first decide whether it was reasona-
bly necessary to employ an attorney to represent the child and then
whether the contingency contract was reasonable as to the amount
of the attorney's fee. " '
A. Legislation
A peace officer may now arrest a person without a warrant when
he has probable cause to believe that the individual has committed
a battery upon his or her spouse, and the officer finds evidence of
bodily harm or he reasonably believes that there is danger of viol-
ence unless the individual alleged to have committed the battery is
arrested without delay."2
309. 330 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
310. 345 So. 2d at 790.
311. Phillips v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 347 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977).
312. FLA. STAT. § 901.15(b) (1977).
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